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Abstract
Although blockchains aim for immutability as their core feature, several instances have
exposed the harms with perfect immutability. The permanence of illicit content inserted
in Bitcoin poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies like Interpol, and millions of dol-
lars were lost in buggy smart contracts in Ethereum. A line of research then spawned on
Redactable blockchains with the aim of solving the problem of redacting illicit contents
from both permissioned and permissionless blockchains. However, all the existing proposals
follow the build-new-chain approach for redactions, and cannot be integrated with existing
running blockchains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.
We present Reparo,1 a generic protocol that acts as a publicly verifiable layer on top of
any blockchain to perform repairs, ranging from fixing buggy contracts to removing illicit
contents from the chain. Reparo follows the layer design, that facilitates additional function-
alities for blockchains while maintaining the same provably security guarantee; thus, Reparo
can be integrated with existing blockchains and start performing repairs in pre-existent
data on the chain. Any system user may propose a repair and a deliberation process ensues
resulting in a decision that complies with the repair policy of the chain and is publicly veri-
fiable. Our Reparo layer can be easily tailored to different consensus requirements, does not
require heavy cryptographic machinery and can, therefore, be efficiently instantiated in any
permissioned or permissionless setting. We demonstrate it by giving efficient instantiations
of Reparo on top of Ethereum (with PoS and PoW), Bitcoin, and Cardano. Moreover, we
evaluate Reparo with Ethereum mainnet and show that the cost of fixing several prominent
smart contract bugs is almost negligible. For instance, the cost of repairing the prominent
Parity Multisig wallet bug with Reparo is as low as 0.000000018% of the Ethers that can be
retrieved after the fix.
∗Friedrich-Alexander-Universita¨t Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg, Germany
†Purdue University, USA
‡Concordium Blockchain Research Center, Aarhus University, Denmark
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1In the Harry Potter universe, ’Reparo’ is the repairing charm that can be used to seamlessly repair broken
objects.
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1 Introduction
Blockchain as the underlying technology of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin [36] and Ethereum [41]
is an append-only, decentralized ledger equipped with public verifiability and immutability.
While immutability in blockchains was always considered attractive, it does come with sev-
eral issues. Immutability in monetary aspects is quite unforgiving; e.g., the infamous DAO
attack [11] exploited a re-entrance bug in a smart contract resulting in the loss of 3.6 million
ETH. In Ethereum alone, other than the DAO bug2 more than 750K ETH worth more than $150
million [2] (at the time of writing) have been either locked, lost or stolen by malicious attackers
or bugs in smart contracts [8, 7, 18]. In a cryptocurrency with a fixed supply of tokens, stolen
or locked tokens pose a huge problem of deflation [24], and even worse, could adversely affect
the consensus process on systems based on Proof of Stake (PoS), which Ethereum 2.0 plans to
adopt [20, 19]. Moreover, writing bug-free software, and therefore smart contracts, seems to be
a long-standing hard problem and the situation only worsens when many such buggy contracts
are uploaded onto the chain resulting in the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars.
Even much-restricted systems such as Bitcoin suffers from the problem of arbitrary data
being inserted in the chain through special transactions,3 where all miners are required to
store and broadcast the data for validation purposes. Several academic and law enforcement
groups have studied the problem of illicit content insertion in Bitcoin [12, 40, 34]. A malicious
user can pay a small fee to post illegal and/or harmful content onto the blockchain via these
special transactions. Interpol [12] reported the existence of such arbitrary content in the form
of illicit materials like child pornography, copyrighted material, sensitive information, etc. on
the Bitcoin blockchain. While screening the contents of a transaction before adding it to the
blockchain seems to be a straightforward solution, Matzutt et al. [34] showed the infeasibility
of this approach while giving a quantitative analysis of already existing contents in the Bitcoin
blockchain. Law enforcement agencies [40] are finding it challenging to deal with this problem,
The new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European states has thrown
the spotlight on the immutability of personal information like addresses, transaction values,
and timestamps [30]. These issues could adversely affect the adaptability of existing blockchain-
based applications, especially for cryptocurrencies if they want to be a credible alternative for
fiat currencies.
1.1 Existing Solutions And Their Limitations
Redactable Blockchains. The seminal work of Ateniese et al. [15] was the first to consider the
mutability of blockchains. Their redactable Blockchain protocol aims to redact illicit contents
from a blockchain using chameleon hash links [32]. However, their protocol requires the miners
to run a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocol which can be quite prohibitive in large
permissionless systems like Bitcoin. Moreover, their protocol requires modifications to the block
structure, making it not useful to remove already existing illicit content in the chain of Bitcoin or
release frozen ethers in Ethereum. We refer to this property as Repairability of Existing Contents
(REC). Puddu, Dmitrienko and Capkun [39]’s proposal suffers from the same problems, and
also, presents the control to modify a transaction by the transaction creator, which is not useful
if the creator does not allow the desired modifications. Derler et al. [23] solve the above problem
by using attribute-based encryption where the transaction creator lets anyone with the right
policy to modify the transaction. While they do not require any large-scale MPC among the
2 The DAO bug was fixed in July 16’ by introducing an ad-hoc fix that runs DAO transactions differently;
resulting in a hard fork, that gave birth to Ethereum Classic.
3Arbitrary information is permitted in Bitcoin through OP RETURN code, that can store up to 80 bytes of
arbitrary data on the blockchain.
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Table 1: Comparison of our work with that of the existing redaction solutions. A cross for Repairability
of Existing Contents (REC) means the proposal is not useful to redact or modify already inserted contents
in blockchain.
Proposals Stateful System-scale REC Public
repairs MPC verifiability
Ateniese et al. [15] × Required × ×
Puddu et al. [39] × Required × ×
Derler et al. [23] × Not required × ×
Deuber et al. [25] × Not required × X
Tezos [29] X Not required × X
This work - Reparo X Not required X X
miners, their protocol lacks public verifiability and requires modifications on how the Merkle
roots are computed in the blocks, hence does not guarantee REC for Bitcoin or Ethereum. The
recent work of Deuber, Magri and Thyagarajan [25] leverages on-chain voting techniques to reach
an agreement on the redaction of contents, thereby adding public verifiability to the redactions.
However, their protocol also requires modifications to the block header and therefore does not
guarantee REC for current systems. Tezos [29] proposed a PoS protocol that can instantiate
any blockchain but does not guarantee REC. While lacking formal security guarantees, it also
lacks efficiency for multiple updates. Given that all the aforementioned proposals are build-
new-chain solutions (no REC) and suffer from other issues as discussed, none of them are
integrable into existing mainstream permissionless blockchain systems guaranteeing REC4 [35].
Table 1 summarizes the above discussed limitations. For an extended technical discussion and
comparison, we refer the readers to Appendix A.
Hard Forks. Performing a repair by forking away from a faulty point in the blockchain
can lead to a loss of blocks. A hard fork requires miners to update their client software and
corresponding mining hardware. Every hard fork brings with it an additional consensus rule
in order to validate the whole chain. These additional rules demand additional storage and
computational capabilities from clients. Hard forks are ad-hoc: in Ethereum, DAO was deemed
to be a big enough bug to fork the chain, whereas Parity Multisig Wallet was not. [8]
Pruning. For repair operations such as redactions or removing old content, there are pruning
solutions that locally redact contents [10]. However, the primary purpose of this method is
space optimization and there is no consensus on what can be removed or redacted. Therefore, a
newly joining full node is still expected to receive all the information on the chain for thorough
validation.
1.2 Our Contributions
We present Reparo (Section 3), which is the first protocol that acts as a layer (in the style of the
finality layer for blockchains from [33]) on top of any existing secure blockchain and allows repair
operations on its contents. Our protocol aims to provide a solution that can be easily integrated
into virtually any existing blockchain system, and departs from the build-new-chain approach in
the literature. Although Reparo is bound to the underlying consensus requirements (e.g., PoW,
PoS, as discussed in Section 3.2), it can easily be adapted to any flavor of consensus (include
permissioned systems) without any overhead. We formally prove that such an integration of
Reparo with a secure blockchain satisfies the standard security properties of chain quality, chain
4In case of permissioned setting, Ateniese et al [15]’s proposal has been commercially adopted by a large
consultancy company [13, 14].
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growth and editable common prefix (which were introduced in [25]). We argue that our Reparo
protocol potentially could improve the parameters of the chain quality of the integrated system.
The main advantage of Reparo as a repair layer in contrast to a repairable blockchain is that,
after integration into systems like Bitcoin and Ethereum, the contents that already exists in these
chains become repairable and thus guaranteeing the REC property: once Reparo is incorporated
into the clients of Bitcoin or Ethereum, any previously existing contents can be repaired. In this
direction, we give a detailed instantiation of our Reparo integration into Ethereum when the
underlying consensus is PoS (Section 4) and PoW (Appendix D.1), Bitcoin (Appendix E.1) and
Cardano (a PoS based system Appendix E.2). We demonstrate how to perform repair operations
in Ethereum, which can fix smart contract bugs. For Bitcoin, we show how to perform redaction
of arbitrary data entries (illicit data) that are non-monetary information without changing the
Bitcoin block structure or using any heavy cryptographic machinery. With respect to [25], our
instantiation with Reparo has comparable efficiency in terms of time and is significantly better
in terms of space efficiency: unlike [25], Reparo does not require an additional hash value to
be stored in every block header (as detailed in Appendix E.1). Also, Reparo is better than a
hard fork. For instance, consider a situation where a user accidentally creates a contract with
no code in it, it is safe for the user to create a repair transaction with Reparo that adds code
to this contract without forking. Users of the system can skip the expensive, cumbersome and
often times arbitrary5 procedures involving a hard fork.
Finally, we offer a proof-of-concept implementation of our Reparo protocol integrated into
Ethereum. As we show in Section 5, when importing the latest 2 million block sub-chain (from
block number 6M to 8M) from the Ethereum main network, our baseline implementation has
an overhead of just 12.52% when compared to its vanilla counterpart. The choice of Ethereum
is motivated by the wide-spread adaption and generality of the Ethereum’s functionalities.
Practical Implications. Apart from illicit data redaction in Bitcoin, for systems such as
Ethereum, a repair involves re-running all the transactions that are affected thus demanding
computation from the network. Therefore, a repair proposal must pay (in gas) an amount
proportional to the computation spent by the network performing the repair. We measure the
repair costs of various existing bugs affecting Ethereum today.
For concreteness, we demonstrate that the Parity Multi Sig Wallet Bug, which locked over
513K ETH, can be repaired today by paying a little over 0.00094 ETH in gas. Reparo also gives
a mechanism to resolve an issue where users submit a contract creation transaction with no
code [9] (due to user errors or buggy wallet code), releasing over 6.53K ETH. Ethereum uses
an ad-hoc fix for DAO as it hard-codes a different logic for DAO. Reparo can be used to remove
this ad-hoc fix by first repairing DAO code (while the fix is still active) and later removing the
fix. One could also handle zero-day vulnerabilities and thereby restrict losses.
Future adopters of blockchains such as governments and corporations can use Reparo as a
provably secure protocol for regulations and maintenance.
1.3 Key Ideas
Reparo acts as a layer on top of an existing blockchain system. The system users agree before-
hand what the policy is going to be for performing repair operations on the chain. This policy
specifies the constraints and requirements a proposal needs to satisfy for getting approved. As
shown in Figure 1, Reparo layer constitutes 6 sequential steps for the case of a redaction pro-
posal. Any user can propose a repair proposal rp1 for block B1 that redacts some contents in
B1. The proposal also determines the updated state of the chain unlike previous proposals.
5 For example, in Ethereum, DAO was deemed to be an important enough attack requiring a hard fork,
whereas the Parity Multisig wallet was not.
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Figure 1: Step by step description of Reparo in case of performing a redaction. The steps are
in gray boxes and highlighted with red color. Here a block is partitioned into a block header
and block body and the block header stores a pointer to the previous block’s header. State st i
denotes the state of the chain after block i has been mined.
A group of users called deciders deliberate on the proposal (step-2) and after the deliberation
process, they post their decision d1 on the chain (step-3). After the decision is posted for rp1,
it is removed from the pool of proposals. Miners check if decision d1 for the proposal rp1 is
positive and if rp1 adheres to the repair policy guidelines. If so, the miners redact the said
contents in block B1 as per the proposal in step 4. Miners update the state of the chain as per
rp1 (step-5) and propose a new block B7 with this updated state resulting in an extension of a
repaired chain (step-6).
The key novelty in Reparo is in the consensus-based and cost-efficient (compared to recreating
an alternate chain) updating of the state st7 that accounts for the states and contents of previous
blocks, new incoming contents and the redaction operation that was performed in step 4. Reparo
also allows repair operations other than redactions also, and in that case, the miners skip step 4
and only update (or repair) the state of the chain according to the proposal. This state update
takes into account the necessary repairs to the chain that the user wishes to perform.
1.4 Discussion
Notice that Reparo possesses public verifiability of proposals, deliberation and repair operations:
Reparo has accountability during and after a deliberation process is over for any repair proposal,
referred to as voting phase accountability and victim and new user accountability [25]. In this
section we argue about some crucial features of Reparo that makes it stand apart from the rest
of the proposals.
What if users decide to retain redacted data? Similar to previous proposals, Reparo
does not enforce complete removal of redacted data from a user’s local storage. Users can still
locally keep redacted data, however, once repaired by Reparo the users are not required by
the blockchain protocol to store the redacted information. For instance, in the case of illicit
content, this means that the miners who locally keep and broadcast illicit (redacted) data can
be prosecuted individually if necessary and the system as a whole is not liable.
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Can a bad set of deciders retroactively censor transactions? Similar to censorship of
transaction inclusion by miners, it is also possible to “censor” transactions retroactively through
repair operations. However, this can be easily mitigated by requiring multiple decider sets across
different deliberation phases to approve a repair operation. Thus, a single bad set of deciders
at a given time interval cannot censor. Moreover, contrary to the censorship on transaction in-
clusion, attempts to censor through repair operations are publicly verifiable as the transaction
is already on chain and the network is aware of the deliberation process.
How is Reparo different from the DAO fix in Ethereum? The hard fork in Ethereum
to fix the DAO bug was an ad hoc software patch in the Ethereum client. On the other hand,
Reparo is a layer on top of the underlying blockchain system that can handle virtually any kind
of repair operations subject to restrictions of the policy.
Using Reparo to perform monetary changes in the state can cause inconsistencies?
Although Reparo here is described in a generic way, in Bitcoin for example the repair policy
could restrict repair operations to be only redaction of auxiliary data that does not affect user’s
balances. For Ethereum, the policy could allow contract bug fixes that indeed affects monetary
balances of user accounts.
2 Blockchain Formalism
2.1 Blockchain as a Ledger
A blockchain is simply a chain (or sequence) of blocks that we call C. The i-th block in the
chain C is denoted by Bi := 〈headeri, xi〉, where headeri = (pt , G(xi), hd) and xi denotes the
messages contained in the block. Here, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ and G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ are
cryptographic hash functions, pt is the hash of the previous block header H(headeri−1) and hd
contains some special header data, such as the consensus proof pii for the block (e.g., a nonce
for PoW or a stakeholder signature for PoS). For a block Bi to be considered valid, it needs
to satisfy a public set of requirements established by the protocol; the requirements can vary
depending on the application of the blockchain, but at the very least the consensus proof pii,
and the set of transactions contained in xi needs to be valid according to some pre-determined
rules.
The rightmost block is called the head of the chain, denoted by Head(C). The sequence of
blocks till the Head(C) defines the state st of the chain C. Any chain C with a head Head(C) :=
〈header, x 〉 can be extended to a new longer chain C′ := C||B′ by attaching a (valid) block
B′ := 〈header′, x ′〉 where pt = H(header) and the state of C′ is updated to st ′; the head of the
new chain C′ is Head(C′) := B′. A chain C can also be empty, and in such a case we let C := ε.
For a chain C of length n and any q ≥ 0, we denote by Cdq the chain resulting from removing
the q rightmost blocks of C, Cqe to denote the chain with the first q blocks of C and we denote
by qeC the chain resulting in removing the q leftmost blocks of C; note that if q ≥ n (where
len(C) = n) then Cdq := ε and qeC := ε. If C is a prefix of C′ we write C ≺ C′. For a more detailed
and precise definition of blockchain and its functionalities and assumptions we refer the reader
to [17].
A secure blockchain satisfies the properties of common prefix, chain growth and chain qual-
ity [27, 37, 31]. it is shown that these properties of the blockchain satisfy persistence and liveness
with which we can classify it as a “healthy” blockchain. Intuitively, in a healthy blockchain
after some time period, all honest users of the system will have a consistent view of the chain,
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Table 2: Interfaces provided by the blockchain protocol Γ. As an example of the stability interface, in
Bitcoin the stable part is the chain pruned by the most recent k blocks (e.g. k = 6). The idea is that
the stable part of a chain will (with overwhelming probability) remain immutable.
Interface Description
Γ.validateChain(C) returns 1 iff all the blocks in the chain are valid according to a
public set of rules and the links between blocks are well-formed
Γ.validateBlock(B) for a block B := 〈header, x 〉 returns 1 iff the block is valid; specif-
ically the hash of x is equal to the data-pointer G(x ) in header.
Γ.broadcast(x ) broadcasts data x to all the parties.
Γ.stable(C) returns the stable part of the chain C.
and transactions posted by honest users will eventually be included. For formal definition of
the above properties, we refer the reader to Appendix B.
2.2 Blockchain Protocol
The basis of our Reparo protocol is a healthy immutable blockchain protocol (e.g., [27, 22]),
denoted by Γ. In Γ, parties are categorized into different roles (not mutually exclusive), namely
users and miners. Users can send inputs in the form of messages while miners try to extend the
blockchain by creating and appending new blocks containing the users’ messages. The existing
blockchain protocols [27, 37, 31] achieve the security properties stated previously, by assuming
that the majority of miners are honest : honest miners behave according to the protocol. We
make the same assumption. Therefore, in protocol Γ we also assume that the majority of miners
are honest (if one instantiates Γ with the protocols from [27, 37, 31]).
We refer as node to any party in the system, be it a user or a miner. Each node locally stores
its current chain C. We assume that nodes automatically update their local chain whenever there
is a better6 valid chain available. We assume that a node has access to the interfaces as described
in Table 2.
3 Reparo Protocol
In this section we show how to extend a given immutable blockchain protocol Γ (as described
in Section 2.2) into a repairable blockchain protocol Γ′ that permits repair operations ranging
from redactions to state updates on the chain.
3.1 Reparo Description
We add an additional category of parties (apart from users and miners) to the set of parties
involved in our protocol, namely deciders. Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive,
e.g., a user can also be a decider and/or a miner.
The Reparo protocol, formally described in Figure 2, allows repair operations on the under-
lying blockchain Γ: redaction of data from Γ and/or special changes in the current state of the
chain. It communicates with Γ through the interfaces described in Table 2. Similar to [25],
Reparo is parametrized by a repair policy P. The integration of Reparo with the blockchain
protocol Γ is denoted by Γ′P. We describe the two flavors of repairs in more details next.
Redactions: Without loss of generality, we consider a redaction to be the removal of the entire
content (i.e., all transactions) of a block. The redactions can be made much more fine-grained
6According to the “best chain rule” of the underlying blockchain system.
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Initialisation (miner/decider). Initialize the proposal pool, propPool← ∅.
Proposal (user). To propose a repair:
1. create repair proposal, rp = 〈(pt , x ′), sp〉.
2. broadcast it to the network, Γ.broadcast(rp).
Update proposal pool (miner/decider). In periodic intervals:
1. collect all valid proposals rp and set propPool← propPool ∪ {rp}.
2. if proposal rp has a corresponding repair witness w in stable(C) set propPool← propPool/{rp} to
remove rp from the pool.
Deliberation process (decider/miners). For each new proposal rp ∈ propPool:
1. deciders deliberate and come to a decision, denoted as w ← decision(rp).
2. miners add hd ← hd ∪ {w}, where hd is part of the next new block.
Repairing the chain (miners). For each w := 〈pt , H(rp), G(x ′), sp, b, pf 〉 ∈ stable(C):
1. if b = 1 and chkApproval(P,w) = 1,
(a) replace the data x in the block pointed by pt by the new data x ′. If x ′ = x no action is needed.
(b) update state st of chain C to st ′ using sp.
2. else if b = 0, ignore rp as deciders have rejected.
Chain validation (miners). Update Γ.validateChain to handle repair operations:
1. start validating block B from genesis.
2. for a block B := 〈header, x 〉, where header := (pt , g, hd), update Γ.validateBlock to do the following
checks:
(a) if G(x ) = g, then no repair has happened, go to step 3.
(b) else, retrieve all repair witnesses of the form w := 〈pt , h′, g′, sp, 1, pf 〉 ∈ C where pt points to
B.
(c) for each of these repair witnesses w in the same order of their retrieval, do the following steps
(exactly as it was performed by the miners originally during repairing):
(i) check if chkApproval(P,w) = 1,
(ii) check if the corresponding repair proposal rp := 〈(pt , x ′), sp〉 (where G(x ′) = g′ and
H(rp) = h′) was performed correctly according to the witness w .
(iii) check if state updates of C was correctly performed according to sp.
(d) for the final repair witness w := 〈pt , h′, g′, sp, 1, pf 〉 in the order that was retrieved:
(i) check if it holds that G(x ) = g′ to see if the current data in B (that is pointed to by pt).
This check also works for redactions.
(ii) check if the final state obtained after applying all the state updates sp from all witnesses
is consistent with the state of the chain at B under validation.
3. finally, ensure that all repair operations that have an approved witness w on the chain have been
performed. This check can be performed on the fly as we validate blocks from the genesis.
Figure 2: Repairable blockchain protocol Γ′P resulted from adding Reparo on top of Γ and with policy
P.
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(e.g., on the transaction level) by adding cumbersome details, what we defer to Section 4, when
we present an instantiation of Reparo on top of Ethereum.
Other repair operations: Or the repair operation acts as any other type of message that changes
the current state of the chain from st to st ′. For instance, in this case, in contrast to normal
messages such as “Alice send some coins to Bob” with Alice authenticating this transfer, these
repair messages can alter the current balances of Alice and Bob arbitrarily without requiring
authentication from either Alice or Bob.
Repair Proposal. Any user can propose any type of repair request. A repair proposal
rp = 〈(pt , x ′), sp〉 consists of a block-pointer pt and the new data x ′ (or ⊥ in case of redaction)
and sp is a (set of) message(s) that describes the desired state change (state st of C is changed
to st ′). If the repair is a redaction, then the original data x stored in the block pointed to by pt
is removed, and the state of the chain is updated using sp. If its not a redaction, then only the
state is updated and no data needs to be modified physically (as x ′ = x where x is stored in the
block pointed to by pt). This means that the state change sp always describes the transition of
state of the chain from st to st ′ irrespective of whether the repair is a redaction or not.
Deliberation. These proposals are collected by miners and deciders. The deciders then use a
publicly verifiable decision protocol decision(rp) to deliberate whether a proposal rp should be
accepted or not. The protocol outputs their final decision in the form of a repair witness w .
Miners then add the witness into the header data of the next created block. For concreteness,
if we let the decision process follow as in [25], where deciders (i.e., the miners themselves) add
their votes to the header data hd of their newly created blocks before broadcasting it to the
network; the witness can then be easily “extracted” from the header data of all the blocks
during the deliberation period, by simply counting how many votes supported the proposal.
The repair witness w := 〈pt , H(rp), G(x ′), sp, b, pf 〉 consists of a block-pointer pt , a pointer
to the corresponding repair proposal H(rp) and the pointer to the new data x ′, the proposed
state-change sp, the decision bit b, and a proof pf which allows to validate the decision (e.g.,
verifiable vote count). Note that the proposed state change sp could be empty, which is the
case when the repair operation is stateless modification. For security, we require the witness
proof pf to be sound, i.e., it should be infeasible for an adversary to produce a valid proof pf ′
for rp if rp was not accepted by the protocol.
Repair Policy. Repair policy P dictates the constraints of different repair operations, e.g.,
what is the duration of the deliberation period, what type of data can be redacted, what changes
in the state are allowed, just as in [25]. For our case, as minimum requirements from a valid
policy P, we have (i) a detailed description of what contents can be redacted and what kind of
state changes are allowed, (ii) a well defined period (in rounds) for the deliberation process for
each proposal, (iii) the header data hd of blocks can not be edited. This implies that repair
witnesses of other proposals cannot be edited, and (iv) system parameters that determine block
creation are not modified. For instance, one cannot modify the mining difficulty (in case of
PoW) that was used in some block in Bitcoin.
Policy Approval. We assume that there is a predicate chkApproval(P,w) which deter-
mines if a proposal rp is approved. It takes as input the policy P, a repair witness w :=
〈pt , H(rp), G(x ′), sp, b, pf 〉 for a repair proposal rp. The predicate outputs 1 if the proposal rp
is accepted by the deciders (b = 1) with a valid proof pf and complies by the policy P, and
outputs 0 otherwise. For the formal analysis of security we refer the reader to Appendix C.
3.2 Consensus-Specific Repair Policies
Here we discuss how the Reparo repair policy P deals with different consensus specific challenges.
Proof of Work (PoW). The set of deciders are chosen in a sybil-resistant manner. When
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the underlying chain is PoW based, one could select the deciders via PoW itself, where the
deciders are required to show proof of work. Necessary bounds on the fraction of adversarial
deciders are discussed in Appendix C. The repair policy of Reparo in this setting need not have
any restrictions on the kind of repair operations that can be performed: data can be redacted
or modified. However, though Reparo does not impose any restrictions, some applications may
prefer to have policies that allow only restricted repair operations. For instance, if one is
interested to redact arbitrary illicit non-payment data from Bitcoin transactions, the Reparo
repair policy P can be set accordingly. On the other hand, if one is interested in fixing buggy
contracts that have cost a lot of money and effort (in case of Ethereum), the policy could be
set to allow specific repair operations on the state of the system.
Proof of Stake (PoS). In case of PoS based consensus, the repair policy should ensure that
repair operations do not invalidate consensus. More specifically, the repair policy P should
disallow redactions of state. This is because PoS inherently relies on the state of the system
for consensus, and removing some state information permanently makes the existing consensus
proofs unverifiable. Of course, redactions that do not affect the state of the chain can still
be performed with Reparo. The repair policy should also ensure that during the deliberation
process the set of deciders do not change. In other words, the deliberation process should
happen in a phase where the set of deciders are fixed. This ensures that any repair operation
does not affect any other ongoing deliberation process or the decider set.
4 Instantiation in Ethereum with Proof of Stake
We discuss PoS in Ethereum and then continue to describe the working of ethereum today. We
then proceed to detail how one can instantiate our Reparo layer protocol of Section 3.1 on top of
Ethereum to support repair operations: redaction of transaction contents and/or state updates
in the form of smart-contracts “patches” and account balance update (e.g., restitution of stolen
coins).
4.1 A Primer on Ethereum
Ethereum [41] is a decentralized virtual machine (Ethereum Virtual Machine or EVM), which
runs user programs - smart contracts - upon user’s request. Roughly, a contract is a collection
of functions and variables, where each function is defined by a sequence of bytecode instructions
that operate on the function input and the variables associated with the contract. The contract
has an address for users in the network to interact with, and this address depends on the
contract creator. A user may interact with a contract through transactions that calls functions
in the contract.
Transactions and Block Structure. An Ethereum transaction tx can serve two purposes:
message calls or special calls. The tx.from field is derived from signature values tx.r, tx.s7.
The tx.to field contains the 160-bit address of the recipient. The tx.value field contains the
amount of ether (in Wei) transfer from the sender to the recipient, and in case of contract
creation it initializes the contract with the amount. The tx.data field optionally contains
EVM bytecode for contract creation or an encoding of a function call of a contract. There are
special reserved recipient addresses like 0x00..0-8 for special calls. These addresses contain
native contracts. Native contracts contain instructions that are not executed by the EVM.
Similar to Bitcoin, Ethereum has a block header and block content associated with a block.
The relevant8contents of the block header are shown and described in Table 3.
7These are ECDSA signatures that help derive the public key and thus, the sender of the transaction.
8There are other fields like ommers hash, receipts root, extra data in the Ethereum block header.
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Table 3: Structure of the Ethereum block header. Relating to the abstract protocol from Figure 2, G
is of the form G = (Gtx ,Gst), and hd = (d, t, ctr).
Value Description
parent hash (pt) hash9of the previous block header
state root (Gst) hash of the root node of the state tree, after all transactions
are executed and finalizations applied
tx root (Gtx ) hash of the root node of the tree structure populated with all
the transactions in the block
difficulty (d) the difficulty of the proof-of-work
timestamp (t) the timestamp of the block
nonce (ctr) value used in proof-of-work
Accounts and State. State in Ethereum is denoted by ACC which consists of account
objects. There are two types of accounts in Ethereum: the external account and the contract
account. Both types of accounts (Acc) contain balance (Acc.bal), storage root (Acc.sr), nonce
(Acc.nonce) and code hash (Acc.h). Acc.sr is the hash digest of the trie encoding of the state of
the contract while code hash Acc.h is the hash of the contract bytecode. An external account
has empty Acc.h and Acc.sr. The effect of the transactions included in a block have on the
accounts is the state of the accounts at the time; reflected in the Acc.bal and Acc.sr fields of
accounts at the time of mining the block and consequently in the state root stored in the
block header.
The ACC is updated every block by using a global state transition function δ : {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. This function takes as input the state of the accounts in the previous block
and new transactions included in the current block and returns the current state of the accounts
in the chain. For block Bi we have ACC i ← δ(ACC i−1,TX i) where ACC i−1 is the state of
accounts in Bi−1. The output of this function can be thought of as the changing of account states
to ACC i from their previous state ACC i−1 after applying the new incoming transactions TX i.
These transactions are validated (signature, balance and nonce checks) according to Ethereum
rules before letting them affect the state transition. Note that ACC is analogous to UTXO in
Bitcoin and is derived from the block but does not exist as a part of the chain.
4.1.1 Ethereum with PoS
We briefly describe the Ethereum protocol when its PoW consensus is replaced with a PoS
consensus like Algorand [28] or Ouroboros Praos (OP) [22]. Algorand is a Byzantine fault
tolerant (BFT) consensus, where a set of nodes (known as committee) is selected through a
sortition procedure based on the weight of the stake they own. Every round, the committee
engage in a Byzantine agreement protocol to produce a new block to be appended in the
Algorand chain. OP, on the other hand is a slot based consensus protocol where time is divided
into slots and blocks are created relative to a slot. Parties with stake can participate in a
slot lottery, and winning the lottery (referred to as slotleader) allows a stakeholder to create a
block in a particular slot. The probability of winning the lottery for a stakeholder is directly
proportional to his stake. Assuming for simplicity that users in Ethereum have one account
each, then OP dictates that the probability of winning the lottery is : φf (Acc) := 1−(1−f)bAcc/S ,
where Acc is the account of the stakeholder, bAcc is the balance in this account, S is the total
stake in the system and f is some difficulty parameter. We make block-box use of the sortition
procedure or the lottery function for our work.
The main difference in contrast to PoW is that the difficulty d and nonce ctr are not in the
9Ethereum uses the 256-bit variant of Keccak/SHA3.
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block header. Instead, generating a validity proof for a block is done by the algorithm prf pos
that outputs a proof σ on the block with respect to some account (address) referred by Acc.
Verifying the proof of stake is done by the algorithm vfy pos.
4.2 Reparo on Ethereum Protocol
In this section we describe Reparo on Ethereum when the PoS consensus is instantiated with
Algorand or OP. The reasoning is that, in both these proposals the stakeholder also happen to
be slotleaders if they are chosen.
As in Section 3, we formally denote a block in Ethereum as B := 〈header,TX 〉(ACC ),
where TX denotes the set of transactions (individual transaction is denoted by Tx), header :=
(pt ,Gtx (TX ),Gst(ACC ), hd) as in Table 3 and ACC denotes the state of the accounts in
Ethereum. Here Gtx (TX ) is the Merkle root of the transactions, Gst(ACC ) is the Merkle
root of the account state.
Regarding the roles of parties when PoS is instantiated with Algorand or OP, we consider
miners or slotleaders in the PoS setting also to be deciders of repair proposals. This means that
the deliberation process happens on the chain with slotleaders voting on proposals by adding
special voting transactions in the header data hd of their blocks. Recall that in Algorand
slotleaders are referred to as the committee members who are chosen to propose a block at that
round. Due to space constraints, we give a formal description of the protocol in Appendix D
(Figure 5).
On a very high level, while performing repair operations, we repair the block contents using
new Reparo data structures. This ensures that the block header always remains unchanged
while only the block contents are repaired. This enables efficient multiple repairs on a block:
multiple repairs on the same block’s state (direct) or the block’s state gets updated multiple
times due to a cascading effect (indirect). Physically repairing block contents while making use
of the Reparo data structures also improves efficiency in terms of consensus for PoS. This is
because the blocks always contain the most recent state of accounts and balances which makes
the retrieval of updated stakeholder distribution in case of PoS easier.
To see how repair operations could affect the state of accounts denoted by A, changing con-
tents can affect the state of the concerned accounts, which could subsequently lead to cascading
changes to other accounts. This is pictorially described in Figure 3 where a user proposes to fix
a buggy contract C in step 1. During the voting period of `(= 5) blocks that coincides with a
PoS epoch, slotleaders vote for the proposal by adding a vote inside the block that they propose
in step 2. The reason for the voting period and the epoch to coincide was explained in Sec-
tion 3.2. If enough votes are obtained and the proposal satisfies some set of policy guidelines, in
step 3 slotleaders fix the contract C according to the proposal. The states of all accounts in the
subsequent blocks are updated amounting to this fix in step 4 and a new state A′8 is obtained
in step 5. In step 6, this updated state is reflected on the chain by proposing the next block
with respect to this state (by including Gst(A
′
8) in the header).
Proposing Repairs. Any user in the system can request a repair of the chain. The user
first broadcasts the candidate transaction Tx? to the network. Then, the user sends a proposal
transaction tx. The tx.to address field contains the special address REQ ADDR. REQ ADDR is a
native contract for Reparo. The tx.data field contains (H(Tx), H(Tx?)), the hash of the old
version (Tx) and the new version (Tx?) of the transaction. For smart contract bug fixes, Tx
was the buggy-contract creation transaction, while Tx? is a similar transaction with the bug
fixed. The repairTx offers processing fees to the slotleader who includes the transaction into
the block and could also offer a approval fee to the slotleader who performs the repair after the
policy approval. The user also adds the new version of the transaction Tx? to the candidate
11
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Figure 3: An overview of Reparo in Ethereum with PoS to fix a buggy contract C in block 1. The
Reparo layer steps are numbered inside gray boxes and highlighted in red. The voting period starts at
the start of the next epoch and lasts for ` = 5 blocks. Proposal ID1 is approved at block 7. The voting
period coincides with the start and end of an epoch.
Algorithm 1: proposeRepair
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn) of length n, an index j ∈ [n], and new set of transactions TX ?j .
output: A repair proposal rp?j .
1: Parse Bj−1 := 〈headerj−1,TX j−1〉(ACC j−1);
2: Build the repair proposal rp?j ← 〈TX ?j ||δ(ACC j−1,TX ?j )〉;
3: return rp?j ;
database for the users to validate and consider voting for the proposal10. A formal description
of proposing a candidate block is given in Algorithm 1. The repair proposal rp?j can be seen as
including the candidate transaction and other unchanged transactions of that block (allowing
fine-grained transaction level changes). It also includes the new state of accounts: as the new
set of transactions (candidate transaction plus other old transactions) are applied on the state
of accounts of the previous block. It is interesting to note here that a repair proposal can be
accompanied by a bounty (in tx.value) incentivizing the network to approve the repair. We
provide more details in Appendix D.2.
Validating Requests. Nodes validate a repair proposal by checking if the proposed new
Tx? is a well-formed transaction as per rules of Ethereum (correct format, correct signatures,
etc) and Tx is in the chain. They also check if the proposal rp?j from Algorithm 1 includes the
correct state of accounts after applying Tx? and other unchanged transactions of block Bj on
the state of accounts in Bj−1. Proposals are rejected as redundant if they are already in the
voting phase.
Reparo Layer. Reparo has new data structures that help store the block contents (transactions
and state of accounts) that enable efficient multiple repairs and chain validation. We have two
such data structures: repair layer Rdb database and approved repairs Adb database. Every
block is associated with its own repair layer Rdb database entry that comes into play when
the block contents are repaired (directly or indirectly). For repairs that are not redactions,
10If a candidate transaction does not have a corresponding repairTx in the blockchain then the transaction is
not included in the candidate pool, and it is treated as spam instead.
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Rdb of the block contains the old version Tx of the transaction that was repaired. In case
of redactions, as discussed in Section 3.2, the policy P only permits non-payment data to be
redacted. These are data whose changes do not affect the state of accounts. In this case the
hash of the old version of the transaction H(Tx) is stored in the Rdb of the block. In the formal
description Figure 5 the entire set of old transactions and state of accounts is stored in the
repair layer. We emphasize that this covers the possibility of many transactions in a block
being repaired multiple times. We note that as a practical optimization, you only need the
old version of the specific transaction to be stored. The approved repairs Adb database, stores
the repair proposal that was approved by the policy at that time. This data structure plays a
crucial role in chain validation. The information stored in these data structures do not need
any special authentication, as they can be validated using simple hash equality checks: in case
of information stored in Rdb, the header of a block stores the corresponding transaction root
and state root, and in case of Adb, the chain stores the hash of the repair proposal (in the form
of votes as explained later).
Repair Policy. We briefly discuss the repair policy P for Ethereum with PoS that determines
if a repair proposal has been approved or not. Although our voting based deliberation process
is similar to the protocol in [25], the deliberation and corresponding policy in Reparo is much
more complicated. Therefore, Γ′.chkApproval in Figure 5 for the policy P and a repair proposal
returns approve, reject or voting: approve and reject means that the repair proposal has
been approved and rejected, respectively, and voting means that the repair proposal is still in
deliberation phase.
Policy P takes in the information from the real world like user discussions, forum discussions,
expert opinions, etc. to see if a particular repair proposal is good for the chain or not. In any
case, we wish to give a minimum policy requirement for redactions and other repair operations
which can later be updated depending on the application. The objective of this minimum
requirement is to enable miners to detect malicious repair proposals that aim at double spending
or stealing coins. We emphasize that this by no means is a complete set of requirements to detect
such behavior, and in fact it may be of independent research interest to frame such policies for
various applications. In other words, enforcement of the policy is not done on chain. The
minimum requirements from the policy P are: (1) The deliberation period for the request began
at the start of the epoch and ended with the end of the same epoch. (2) The proposal does not
propose to modify the address fields or the value field of a transaction. (3) The proposal does
not redact or modify votes in the chain. (4) The proposal has received more than ρ fraction of
votes (50% of votes) in the epoch (` consecutive blocks which is voting period, and can decided
by the system) after the corresponding repairTx is included in the chain. And finally, (5) the
proposal is (unambiguously) not a double spend attack attempt (which needs information from
the real world for confirmation).
Deliberation by Voting. In the deliberation process, the slotleaders vote for a repair proposal
by generating a voting transaction voteTx and including that in the block that they propose.
If the votes received is approved according to chkApproval with policy P, slotleaders consider
these votes as the witness w (as in Figure 2). The Tx.to address field of the voteTx is a special
address VOTE ADDR and the Tx.data field contains the hash of the old transaction and the hash
of the candidate transaction. Formally, we define the interface:
H
(
Gtx (TX j),Gtx (TX
?
j )
)← Γ′.Vt(C, rp?j ): takes as input a repair proposal rp?j and outputs
the hash value of the Tx.data field of the corresponding repair proposal as a vote.
Note that we use Gtx instead of H for TX j and TX
?
j , as we deal with set of old and
new transactions. The reason for using H
(
Gtx (TX j),Gtx (TX
?
j )
)
stems from the need to allow
redactions and other repairs to be performed on TX j or TX
?
j , while later a new user can verify
this without providing the original TX j or TX
?
j itself.
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Performing Repairs. Upon approval with respect to the policy P:
• Redactions: These operations are restricted by the policy P to not affect the state of
accounts in Ethereum chain. Withstanding this restriction, the original transaction is replaced
by the candidate transaction and the repair layer stores the hash of the old version of the
transaction. We use retainAndRedact(TX j) function, which returns the hash of the redacted
transaction and all other unedited transactions in TX j in the original form Algorithm 2. If
a version of the transaction is stored in either Rdb or Adb, it is redacted too ensuring that a
redacted transaction is not stored even in the Reparo layer.
• Other repairs: For other repairs, the old version of the transaction is stored in the repair
layer Rdb associated with the block. The candidate transaction then replaces the old version in
the block. The state of accounts (for this block and the following blocks) is updated according to
the repaired transactions. When updating the state for each block, we ensure that the original
state of accounts is stored in the corresponding repair layer Rdb. Once the state updates reach
the head of the chain, the slotleader proposes a new block with this updated state of accounts.
Algorithm 2 gives a formal description, where entire set of original transactions and state are
stored in the repair layer (thus covering the possibility of multiple repair operations on a block).
For improving space efficiency one could store only the old version of the transaction.
Note that, since a repaired block always contains the most recent state, performing multiple
indirect state updates is efficient as we only apply the transition function over the block’s latest
contents during each of the state updates.
Algorithm 2: repairChain
input : Chain C = (B1, . . . , Bn) of length n, repair layer Rdb = (Rdb1, . . . ,Rdbn), and a repair
proposal rp?j .
output: Chain C′, repair layer Rdb′
1: Parse Bj := 〈headerj ,TX j〉(ACC j), rp?j := 〈TX ?j 〉;
2: Set B?j ← 〈headerj ,TX ?j 〉;
. If block is never repaired then store original state.
3: if Rdbj = ∅ then if rp?j is a redaction proposal, set Rdbj ← 〈retainAndRedact(TX j)||ACC j〉,
otherwise set Rdbj ← 〈TX j〉;
4: else Parse Rdbj := TX
′
j , and if rp
?
j is a redaction proposal, set
Rdbj ← 〈retainAndRedact(TX ′j)||ACC ′j〉;
5: Initialize C′ ← Cj−1e||B?j , and Rdb′ ← Rdbj−1e||Rdbj ;
. Update repair layer of blocks in between
6: for i = j + 1 to n do
7: Initialize Rdb?j = ∅;
8: Parse Bi := 〈headeri,TX i〉(ACC i);
9: if i− 1 = j then Set Bi−1 = B?j ;
10: Parse Bi−1 := 〈headeri−1,TX i−1〉(ACC i−1);
11: Set TX ?i ← TX i and ACC ?i ← δ(ACC i−1,TX i);
12: Set the block B?i ← 〈headeri,TX ?i , 〉;
13: if Rdbi = ∅ then Rdb?i ← (TX i) ;
14: Set Rdb′ ← Rdb′||Rdb?i , and C′ ← C′||B?i ;
15: return C′,Rdb′;
Block Validation. A formal description of the procedure can be found in Algorithm 3 which
is invoked during the chain validation. The procedure checks if the transactions included in the
block are valid as done currently in Ethereum. It then checks if the hash link is rightly formed.
In case no repair proposal has been approved in this block, the only remaining checks are to
see if the state of accounts in the block are correct and if the slotleader has produced a valid
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Algorithm 3: validateBlock
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn), repair layer Rdb = (Rdb1, · · · ,Rdbn), block Bn+1, repair
approved Adbn+1.
output: {⊥, (C′,Rdb′)}
1: Parse Bn+1 := 〈headern+1,TX n+1〉(ACCn+1), where headern+1 = (ptn+1, G(TX n+1), hdn+1);
2: Parse Bn := 〈headern,TX n〉(ACCn), where headern = (ptn, G(TX n), hdn);
3: Validate transactions TX n+1, if invalid return ⊥;
4: if ptn+1 6= H(headern) then return ⊥;
5: if Adbn+1 = ∅ ∧ACCn+1 = δ(ACCn,TX n+1) ∧ vfy pos
(C, hdn+1, (ptn+1, G(TX n+1))) = 1 then
Set C′ ← C||Bn+1, and Rdb′ ← Rdb||∅, and return (C′,Rdb′);
. Validate Blocks where repairs were approved
6: Initialize C′ ← C,Rdb′ ← Rdb;
7: for all TX ?j ∈ Adbn+1 do
. Perform all the repair operations
8: Parse Bj := 〈headerj ,TX j〉(ACC j), where headerj = (ptj , G(TX
′
j), hd j);
9: if chkApproval
(
P, H
(
Gtx (TX j),Gtx (TX
?
j )
)) 6= approve then return ⊥;
10: Set ACC ?j := δ(ACC j−1,TX
?
j );
. Perform the repairs as originally performed
11: C′,Rdb′ ← repairChain(C′,Rdb′, rp?j );
12: Parse C′ := (B′1, · · · , B′n) and B′n := 〈header′n,TX
′
n〉;
. Check the state transition after repair
13: if ACCn+1 = δ(ACC
′
n,TX n+1) ∧ vfy pos
(C, hdn+1, (ptn+1, G(TX n+1))) = 1 then Set
C′ ← C||Bn+1, and Rdb′ ← Rdb||∅ and return (C′,Rdb′);
14: return ⊥;
proof of stake. If any repair proposals were approved by the policy at this block, the procedure
performs these repairs on the chain while performing the required state updates for the blocks.
After all the approved repairs until this block have been applied, the procedure checks if the
state of accounts in the block under contention are consistent with the updated states of the
previous blocks. Finally, it checks if the header is correctly formed with the correct stakeholder
as the slotleader.
Chain Validation. On receiving a new chain, the chain validation procedure formally de-
scribed in Algorithm 4 starts validating the blocks from the genesis of the chain. It first switches
the block contents with the corresponding transactions and states stored in the repair layer.
This results in the chain (Corg) in its originally mined state. The procedure then validates each
block as discussed above using Γ′.validateBlock. This results in performing the repairs (both
redactions and other repair operations) as they were performed in sequence. We then obtain a
chain in its updated current state and is checked if it is the one that was received.
4.3 On Security and Optimizations
We discuss briefly Reparo’s security, and other optimizations possible for our Ethereum
instantiation.
Security Since the hash function H is modeled as a random oracle (RO), finding a collision
on a vote (which is the hash of the ID of the old transaction and the ID of the candidate
transaction) is highly improbable. Therefore, when a slotleader votes for a repair proposal in
his block, no adversary can claim a different repair proposal for the same vote value. Similarly
no adversary can find a different block that hashes to the same hash of an honestly proposed
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Algorithm 4: validateChain
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn) of length n, repair layer Rdb = (Rdb1, · · · ,Rdbn) and approved
repairs Adb = (Adb1,Adb2, . . . ,Adbn).
output: {0, 1}
1: Initialize Corg ← B1;
2: for j = 2 to n do
3: Parse Bj := 〈headerj ,TX j〉(ACC j), where headerj = (ptj , G(TX
′
j), hd j);
4: Parse Rdbj := (TX
?||ACC ?);
5: if TX ?||ACC ? = ∅ then TX ?j ← TX j ;
6: else TX ?j ||ACC ?j ← TX ?||ACC ? ;
. In case of redactions, we have TX ? = retainAndRedact(TX j), from which the original
transaction merkle root Gtx (TX ?) can be computed
7: if Gtx (TX
′
j) 6= Gtx (TX ?j ) ∨Gst(ACC ′j) 6= Gst(ACC ?j ) then return 0;
8: Corg ← Corg||〈headerj ,TX ?j 〉;
9: Initialize Rdb? ← ∅;
10: Parse Corg := (Borg1 , . . . , Borgn );
. Validate each block starting at genesis
11: for j = 2 to n do
12: Set op ← validateBlock(Cj−1eorg ,Rdb?, Borgj ,Adbj);
13: if op = ⊥ then return 0;
14: else Parse op := (C′,Rdb′);
15: Set Corg ← C′||jeCorg, Rdb? ← Rdb′;
16: if Corg = C ∧ Rdb? = Rdb then return 1 ;
17: return 0
block. Therefore an adversary cannot break the integrity of the chain. Together, they imply
the unforgeability of votes: if an adversary wishes to vote, he has to possess enough stake to
propose a block with his vote himself. Assuming appropriate threshold on adversarial stakes
and the honest stakeholders follow the policy P, Reparo integration satisfies editable common
prefix and preserves chain quality and chain growth.
Effect on Stake Distribution. Reparo’s repair operations, like fixing smart contract bugs,
affects the balances of users and hence the stake distribution is altered. During the deliberation
phase, it is the stakeholders who vote for a request fully aware of how the stake distribution
change affects them. Assuming rational slotleaders and honest majority in the stakeholders,
a slotleader votes for those repair requests that are not obvious double spend attacks and has
least negative impact on his stake. The honest behaviour is enforced through public verifiability
of a slotleader’s votes.
Optimizations. To lower the costs of repair operations in Ethereum, we propose Depth-
based future approval : Depending on the depth d of the contract that needs repairs, the system
can have a parameter p that integrates the fix into the main chain in block number d/p after
approval. For example, at block number 8M if a contract deployed at block number 1M was
found to have a vulnerability, then with d = 7M, p = 1000, the fix will be integrated into
the chain 7, 000 blocks after the corresponding repairTx is approved. This alleviates the
computational load on the network by giving them more time to perform repairs that are deep
in the chain. Few other optimizations are discussed in Appendix D.
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5 Experiments in Ethereum
In this section, we report a proof-of-concept implementation of the Reparo protocol on top of
Ethereum [4].
We implement two new types of transactions, namely repairTx and voteTx, and measure
their performance with respect to a baseline transaction in Ethereum. We also measure the
overhead of implementing these special transactions on the Ethereum main network by measur-
ing the time taken to import the latest 2 million blocks. We measure the time taken to import
the blockchain because these introduce overheads for syncing (fully/partially) with the network
(see Table 4).
In Ethereum, computation is measured in terms of the gas it needs to run the transaction
in the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Hence, we take a look at the gas costs to repair (by
fixing) some popular bugs by computing the transaction dependency graph for the contract
creation transaction for these bugs. We estimate the gas cost to re-run all the dependent
transactions and provide real-world numbers on the cost of such repairs in Table 6.
Setup and System Configurations. We modify the Go client for Ethereum (geth) for our
experiments. We use the version 1.9.0-unstable-2388e425-20190528 from the official Github
repository as the base version. We set the geth cache size to 10, 000 MB and disable the P2P
discovery (using the --nodiscover flag). The import was done using an export file consisting
of blocks from block number 6, 000, 000 to 8, 038, 219 (latest block as of Jun 27, 2019) created
by the export command from a fully synced node.
Our experiments employed the following hardware/software configuration: CPU : 24 core,
64-bit, Intel R© Xeon R© Silver 4116 CPU clocked at 2.10 GHz; RAM : 128 GB; OS : Ubuntu;
Kernel : 4.15.0-47-generic.
Chain Selection. We choose a subset of the chain from block number 6, 000, 000 to 8, 038, 219
from the main network. This subset spans almost 1 year (approx. 342 days). It is representative
because the chosen subset accounts for 49.75% of the total gas (and thus computation) in
Ethereum. The first 6 million blocks have 13, 472, 636.72 million gas (Mgas) while the chosen
subset has 13, 339, 193.15 Mgas. In terms of transaction volume, the first 6 million blocks have
273, 900, 932 transactions while the chosen subset has 209, 746, 714 transactions. This accounts
for 43.37% of the transaction volume in Ethereum. In terms of block volume, the subset accounts
for 25.36% of the whole chain. Another reason to consider this subset is the uniformity of the
consensus algorithm. Ethereum uses different consensus rules depending on the block number
(based on whether the block is a part of Homestead, Frontier or Metropolis release). The chosen
subset has a mix of Byzantium (62.80%) and Constantinople (37.20%) forks, both of which are
a part of the Metropolis release. The rules are similar apart from the reduced block rewards
and EVM instruction optimizations in Constantinople.
System-Level Optimizations. We employ the following system-level optimizations in our
implementation.
1. Database choice for Reparo: geth implements three types of key-value databases: Memory
Databases which reside in the system memory, Cached and Uncached Databases which reside on
the disk. The repair layer only stores active requests and the votes for these requests. Hence,
a memory database is ideal to implement repairTx and voteTx.
2. Native Contracts for repairTx and voteTx: Native contracts are client-side implemen-
tations of functionalities that are too complex or expensive (in terms of gas) to be implemented
inside the EVM. For example, the Ethereum yellow paper [41] uses native contracts to perform
SHA3 and ecrecover (a function that returns the address from ECDSA signature values r, s).
We use native contracts to support Reparo.
3. Fast sync and light-client friendliness: Fast sync is a mode used by the Ethereum clients.
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In this mode, the clients download the entire chain but only retain the state entries for the
recent blocks (pruning). In bandwidth, our implementation only needs to download |C| + m
from full nodes, where m is the number of updates and the final space storage is still |C| as the
nodes can discard the repair layer after syncing.
5.1 Special Transactions: repairTx , voteTx
repairTx and voteTx have special to addresses REQ ADDR = 0x09 and VOTE ADDR = 0x0D re-
spectively.
The transactions are always collected in the transaction pool. We modify the transaction
pool logic, specifically validateTx(). After ensuring well-formedness of inputs, for repairTx
we check that the data field is exactly 64 bytes long and the first 32 bytes correspond to the
transaction hash of an existing transaction in the chain. For voteTx, we check that the data
field contains exactly 32 bytes.
The input for repairTx consists of hash of the transaction H(Tx) which is to be repaired
and the hash of the proposed new transaction H(Tx?). The validation logic ensures that Tx
exists in the blockchain (repaired blockchain) by adding a new function isTransactionTrue(). In
the implementation of the native code for this transaction, we add the request to the request
memory database, indexed by ID = H(H(Tx)||H(Tx?)) and initialize it with 0 votes. This
database is created on demand. The footprint of the database is small as we will need to
process about 16, 384 repair requests before occupying 1 MB. In contrast, the default cache
memory used by the client ranges from 512 to 4096 MB depending on the client version and is
therefore a safe assumption to make.
The input for voteTx is the ID described previously. The validation logic ensures that
the input is well-formed (of correct length). In the implementation of the native code for
this transaction, we check if the request exists in the request memory database. If found, it
increments the vote by one. Otherwise, it throws an error and aborts the transaction.
To evaluate the performance overheads of the special transactions on the client (and the
network), we compare it with a baseline transfer transaction involving a transfer of ETH between
two accounts. The transfer function has the lowest gas requirements (21, 000). repairTx (5.90%
overhead) takes 76.09 ms and voteTx (0.055% overhead) takes 71.89 ms when compared to a
transfer transaction which takes 71.85 ms on an average over 100 iteration. (Refer Table 4.)
5.2 Performing Repairs
In this series of experiments, we analyze the impact of supporting Reparo on client software.
For every block, supporting Reparo adds an overhead of checking for approved repairs. If
approvals are found, we repair the block body accordingly. In this section, we analyze the read-
write overheads to support the repair, the cost of building new states and applying transaction
Table 4: Comparison of operations between the modified client and the unmodified client
Operation Type
Client Type
Unmodified Modified
repairTx Time (ms) - 76.09
voteTx Time (ms) - 71.89
Transfer Time (ms) 71.85 71.85
Import Time (Hours) 100.46 113.04
Import Speed (Mgas/s) 37.42 33.08
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Table 5: Contract creation transaction dependency graph for some prominent bugs. We trace the
number of transactions that are dependent on the contract creation transaction. We also compute the
total (maximum) number of accounts whose state could be affected if the concerned transaction were
repaired.
Bug Accts. Affected Tx Affected
DAO 55.51 M 474.45 M
QCX 55.31 M 470.63 M
Parity 48.67 M 399.08 M
REXmls 52.44 M 437.21 M
No Code 2.98 K 2.98 K
Table 6: Estimated repair costs (today) using Reparo. m, K, M and T stand for milli(10−3), Kilo(103),
Mega(106) and Tera(1012) multipliers respectively.
Bug ETH Stuck
Costs of repair in Reparo
Tx Re-runs Gas ETH
DAO 3.60 M 474.45 M 30.17 M 30.17 K
QCX 67.32 K 20.77 K 805.89 M 0.80
Parity 517.34 K 1 9.39 M 94.00 m
REXmls 6.67 K 1.04 K 114.74 M 0.114
No Code 6.53 K 2.98 K 438.85 M 439.00 m
dependencies to repair some real-world bugs (check Table 7 for details about these bugs). We
use an unedited (clean) chain for our experiments.
Read-Write Costs. In this experiment, we measure the time to update the data of a block.
This experiment helps to estimate the I/O overheads of transaction updates in the blockchain. A
repair consists of finding a transaction in the blockchain and replacing it with a new transaction.
The transaction repair overhead consists of the time taken by a node to read the transaction
metadata (block hash, block number and the transaction index in the block) and write the
new transaction data. We point the old hash to the new transaction data so that when the
hash of the old transaction is accessed, the repaired transaction is furnished by the blockchain.
We measure the read and write times for 10, 000 random transactions from random blocks in
the chain. Random transactions ensure that internal (database, software or operating system)
caches do not skew the measurements. The time taken to read the metadata is 649.81µs and
the write operation takes 2.32 ms on average over 100 runs for each of the 10, 000 transactions.
Import Costs. In this experiment, we evaluate the time it takes to import our chain subset
using the modified and unmodified versions of the client. The geth client imports blocks in
batches. For example, the first batch consists of 3 blocks, starting from block number 6, 000, 000,
the next batch consists of 13 blocks and so on. We log the amount of gas (in million gas) in
such batches and the time elapsed for the import (and thus compute the speed). We perform
3 iterations on both the modified and unmodified clients. We plot these speeds for the entire
import process for the unmodified and modified clients in Figure 4. The average speed for the
two clients are presented in Table 4. In Figure 4, we present the speed as the import progresses.
As evident from the graph, for most of the parts the modified client is equal to or slightly slower
than the unmodified client. This is reasonable in the real world as the slight import delay per
block can be accounted for by reducing the gas limit of the block (and thus the computation
performed on each block allowing Reparo to utilize the remaining time).
On average, the unmodified client takes 100.46 hours to import 2, 038, 219 blocks whereas
our modified client takes 113.04 hours to import the same blocks. (Refer to Table 4.) This
is just 12.52% overhead for a full import of more than 2 million blocks. It does not have any
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Figure 4: Batched speed comparison of the modified client and the unmodified client. The modified
client has a modified validateTx rule, a new function isTransactionTrue, and modified structures
with flags to detect a dirty (edited chain and blocks).
significant effect on the block generation, block validation or block propagation as this can be
tweaked by reducing the difficulty and/or gas limit of the blocks.
The average amount of gas processed by the unmodified client is 37.42 million gas per
second whereas the modified client processes 33.08 million gas per second (Table 4). This
11.59% overhead is due to the hard coding of rules for special transactions whose conditions are
checked for every transaction. This overhead does not cause any problems as the average gas
limit for an Ethereum block is 8, 000, 000 (which is under 33 Mgas/s) [3] and both the nodes
perform optimally to sync the latest blocks and propagate. Note that this affects the full sync
nodes only. Note that the light clients, such as Parity [6] for example, skip verification of states
and are thus unaffected.
Transaction Dependency Graph. To estimate the amount of extra gas required to repair
a transaction Tx, we compute transaction dependency graphs for contract creation transac-
tions. We infact measure the worst possible scenario when a transaction has an impact on
all transactions that follow directly and indirectly from it. We perform this by marking the
affected accounts and checking every transaction if they have a marked account in the from or
to fields. We choose some of the popular bugs (described in Table 7) DAO, Parity Multisig
Wallet bug, QCX, REXmls and a class of bugs No code. The chosen contracts occur very deep
in the blockchain giving us realistic estimates for repairs. Table 5 shows the cascading effects
of changing transactions.
Repairs. We employ a policy which allows editing any contract call in order to repair the
chain. We qualify our previous pessimistic analysis by arguing that most of the repairs have
small transaction dependency graphs. This is due to the localization of impact to a few accounts.
We bound the number of transactions that need to be re-run to transactions that interact with
the contract. This coupled with the fact that we are performing a repair ensures a small
transaction dependency graph which significantly reduces the repair costs. Table 6 we highlight
the impact of such localizations. We sum the gas in all such transactions to estimate the gas
cost of repairs and thus the ETH. Note that we always pay the miners (and hence the network)
for the extra computation. We use a gas price of 1 GWei/gas (market price at the time of
20
writing) for our conversions. We refer the interested readers to Appendix D.3 for more details
about the bugs and our solutions.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This work presents Reparo, a secure, systematic way to make any blockchain forget the “for-
gettable”. We present a generic protocol that is adaptable to consensus requirements, and
achieves public verifiability and secure chain repairs guaranteeing REC for current mainstream
blockchains. We then design and analyze an important application of the protocol in Ethereum
to fix contract bugs, and report the implications and feasibility of these repairs for popular
contract bugs such as DAO and Parity Multi Sig Wallet. We also provide optimizations that
can make the implementation more robust and realizable. We show that, in Ethereum, vul-
nerabilities, if found, (and existing vulnerabilities) can be immediately isolated to reduce the
transaction dependency and repaired efficiently and securely.
In the future, we aim to realize the Reparo protocol on permissioned systems such as Hyper-
ledger. We also intend to study the impact of Reparo on off-chain protocols and whether it can
be used to improve them. Among other repair operations, Reparo also offers a means to pro-
pose, deliberate and incorporate new features into Bitcoin and Ethereum given the respective
communities currently do this in an ad-hoc manner [1, 5].
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A Detailed Related Work
To solve the problem of illicit data stored in blockchains, Ateniese et al. [15] proposed the first
redactable blockchain protocol which uses chameleon hash links [21]. Their solution is catered
to the permissioned setting where select miners can come together and redact contents from
the blockchain using a large scale MPC protocol. Unfortunately, their large scale MPC in a
dynamic entry-exit permissionless setting seems to make it infeasible for their proposal to solve
the above discussed problems in Bitcoin and Ethereum. Their proposal apart from requiring
modifications to the block header structure, does not work with SHA256 and requires chameleon
hashes. Therefore the protocol is not backward compatible to any of the existing chains like
Bitcoin or Ethereum.
Puddu et al. [39] proposed a protocol where senders encrypt all but one version of their
transactions to the miners along with a mutation policy. The un-encrypted version remains the
valid version on the chain. The miners abiding by the policy can decrypt (via MPC if decryption
keys are shared) alternate versions and make those versions valid. However, a malicious sender
may not include any alternate version at all or may have a mutation policy where only he
can make retrieve the alternate versions. Moreover, similar to [15], this proposal too suffers
from scalability issues with large scale MPC in a permissionless setting and is not backward
compatible with existing chains.
Derler et al. [23] proposed attribute based modification of chain contents while relying on
chameleon hashes. Unlike in [15], here chameleon hashes are not used for hash links but for
transaction hashes in computing the merkle root. Any user can tag an object with an access
policy before posting it on the blockchain and only the users with attributes satisfying this policy
can later decide to modify the object. However, in their setting changing from the old version
to the new version of the transaction does not affect the transaction merkle root. Therefore a
user cannot decide whether and where something was changed or not. This creates problems
when the underlying consensus mechanism is PoS that relies on the state (i.e., accounts and
balances) of the chain. A new user can no longer verify the consensus that was generated with
the old version of the transaction as it does not exist anymore. In other words, the proposal lacks
accountability as the rewritings are indistinguishable and lacks verifiability of (state dependent)
consensus with respect to new users. Also, similar to [39] this proposal relies on the user to set
an attribute policy which may not be useful if the user sets a policy that only his own or his
colluder’s attributes can satisfy.
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Deuber, Magri and Thyagarajan [25] proposed the first efficient redactable protocol for a
permissionless setting. They rely on achieving voting based consensus to perform redactions.
The block structure is modified to have two hash links instead of one and if the previous
block is redacted, one of the links breaks while the other holds. This gives accountability and
public verifiability of where and what was redacted from the lens of a new user unlike the
above mentioned proposals. They do not make use of any heavy cryptographic machinery and
therefore achieve better efficiency in the permissionless setting. As their focus is only to redact
illicit contents that does not affect payment information, their protocol fails to deal with stateful
edits like doing smart contract bug fixes in Ethereum that have a cascading effect. Since their
protocol is tailor made for PoW based systems, it is unclear how they do stateless or stateful
edits in PoS based systems. And finally, their protocol is not backward compatible with any
existing blockchains given their requirement of the block structure modification. For a more
detailed comparison with [25], we refer the reader to Appendix E.1.
Florian et al. [26] propose for miners to locally drop harmful data. Although efficient in
case of Bitcoin, they do not focus on global consensus on what to be erased. Differing miners
end up in different forks which severely limits their functionality, which is aggravated in case
of stateful edit operations. Politou at al. [38] present a comprehensive survey of the various
solutions that have been proposed to edit a blockchain and also give the relevance of GDPR
laws for blockchains.
Tezos [29] proposed a generic and self-amending blockchain. They provide a generic interface
for meta-upgrades, i.e changes to the code. The interface is generic and can be instantiated
on any blockchain such as Bitcoin [36] and Ethereum [41]. Tezos creates a testnet with the
proposed changes/amendments and if there is sufficient confidence in the testnet (via votes
from stakeholders) promotes the testnet as the main protocol.
This schemes has several drawbacks. Tezos can instantiate any blockchain protocol by using
the appropriate genesis block. However, Tezos cannot be instantiated on an existing blockchain.
In other words, Tezos cannot be used to repair existing blockchains.
Another drawback of this scheme is that at any point in time, only one proposal is under
consideration (by being in the testnet). The proposal under consideration is always the one
with the most approvals. Even if all the nodes in the system agree to the change, it takes a
minimum of four quarters and two rounds of voting to integrate the change. This is inefficient
when compared to our proposed scheme.
B Security Definitions
The common-prefix property states that if one take the chains of two honest users at distinct
time slots, the shorter chain (minus a few blocks) is a prefix of the longer chain. This property
implies the immutability of the underlying blockchain Γ. Chain growth property intuitively says
that the chain C will eventually grow in number of blocks as the protocol progresses. The chain
quality property says that the ratio of blocks produced by malicious users in the chain C can be
upper bounded.
Definition 1 (Common Prefix [27]). The chains C1, C2 possessed by two honest parties at the
onset of the slots sl1 < sl2 are such that Cdk1  C2, where Cdk1 denotes the chain obtained by
removing the last k blocks from C1, where k ∈ N is the common prefix parameter.
Definition 2 (Chain Growth [27]). Consider the chains C1, C2 possessed by two honest parties
at the onset of two slots sl1, sl2, with sl2 at least s slots ahead of sl1. Then it holds that
len(C2)− len(C1) ≥ τ · s, for s ∈ N and 0 < τ ≤ 1, where τ is the speed coefficient.
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Definition 3 (Chain Quality [27]). Consider a portion of length `-blocks of a chain possessed
by an honest party during any given round, for ` ∈ N. Then, the ratio of adversarial blocks in
this ` segment of the chain is at most µ, where 0 < µ ≤ 1 is the chain quality coefficient.
C Security Analysis
In this section we formally argue the security properties of the repairable blockchain Γ′P resulting
from the composition of an immutable blockchain Γ and our repair layer Reparo in the presence
of a valid policy P. By validity of P we mean that the policy satisfies the minimum requirements
listed above.
Recall that the underlying blockchain Γ is assumed to satisfy the security properties of
Chain growth, Chain quality and common prefix, formally stated in Appendix B. Also, note
that the assumptions of the underlying blockchain Γ must still hold (e.g., trusted majority),
and in particular this means that in a PoS blockchain the majority of the stake must be in the
hands of honest users during the entire lifetime of the system. We show that the protocol Γ′ still
preserves chain growth and chain quality. By preservation of the property we mean that the
resulting protocol has at least the same guarantees as the original protocol Γ, but potentially
stronger.
Chain Growth. Assuming that Γ satisfies chain growth it is not hard to see that the Reparo
added on top of Γ does not influence the chain growth rate of the resulting protocol Γ′, as
Reparo does not dictate how often new blocks are created and appended to the chain. We give
the corollary statement below.
Corollary 1. If Γ satisfies (τ, s)-chain growth, then Γ′P preserves (τ, s)-chain growth for any
valid policy P.
Chain Quality. Interestingly, when we assume that the majority of the deciders are honest
and a majority endorsement is required for decision to output a witness, the Reparo protocol can
potentially “improve” the chain quality coefficient of the resulting repairable blockchain Γ′. To
see this, consider an adversarially produced block Bi ∈ C. A repair operation rp proposed and
accepted for block Bi could be seen as “turning” the block Bi into an honest block since the
contents of Bi are now agreed by the protocol. This is because for the repair to be performed,
it needs to be accepted by decision(rp) which needs a majority of the deciders (i.e., miners in
the case of a permissionless setting) to endorse. Hence, by the honest majority assumption of
the underlying blockchain Γ, any accepted repair operation must be backed by at least 1 honest
miner (or more, depending on the policy P), thereby increasing the ratio of honest blocks in C.
Corollary 2. For all witnesses wi ∈ C, let pf ∈ wi be a sound proof. If Γ satisfies (µ, `)-chain
quality, then Γ′P preserves (µ, `)-chain quality for any valid policy P.
Common Prefix. It can happen that two honest miners will perform the same repair operation
at different times, and in the period in between it can happen that they do not have a common
prefix. Note however, that a repair is only performed once its accepting repair witness is in
the stable part of the chain. Hence, we do not have to deal with rollbacks. There are two
observations to be made:
• This time period is small (i.e., 1 network delay). If the witness is stable for one miner
then it must become stable for the other honest miners as soon as they see all the blocks that
the first miner saw. Therefore, the repair operation might briefly disturb common prefix, but
not for long.
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• If a repair operation is a redaction that does not alter the state of the chain, the common
prefix can be momentarily violated, but at no point it is violated when just considering the
state of the chain.
Even though Γ′ does not satisfy the common-prefix property as stated in Section B, following
the lines of [25], we show that the protocol Γ′ satisfies the Editable common prefix property
introduced by [25].
Definition 4 (Editable Common prefix). The chains C1, C2 of length l1 and l2, respectively,
possessed by two honest parties at the onset of the slots sl1 ≤ sl2 satisfy one of the following:
1. Cdk1  C2, or
2. for each Bj ∈ Cd(l2−l1)+k2 such that Bj /∈ Cdk1 , it must be the case that ∃wi ∈ Cd(l2−l1)+k2
such that chkApproval(P,wi) = approve and pt i := H(Bj).
Here, Cd(l2−l1)+k2 denotes the chain obtained by pruning the last (l2 − l1) + k blocks from C2,
P denotes the chain policy, repair witness w corresponds to a redaction proposal rp, pt i is the
pointer contained in wi, and k ∈ N denotes the common prefix parameter.
Theorem 1. If Γ satisfies k-common prefix, then Γ′P satisfies k-editable common prefix for a
valid policy P.
Proof. If no repair operations were performed in the chain C, then the protocol Γ′P behaves
exactly like the protocol Γ. Henceforth the common prefix property follows directly.
However, in case of some repair operations, consider an adversary A that proposes a repair
rp := 〈(H(headeri), x ′i), sp〉 to repair contents of Bi in chain C2. The proposal is later accepted
and the repair witness w = 〈H(headeri), H(rp), G(x ′i), sp, 1, pf 〉 is included in the chain which
is then executed by an honest party P2 at slot sl2. Observe that by the unforgeability property
of the witness proof pf , A is not able to efficiently produce a valid proof pf ′ for another repair
proposal rˆp that was not accepted. Therefore, since P2 is honest and incorporated the repair rp
in C2, it must be the case that rp was accepted by at least the majority of the deciders. Thus
making all the honest parties incorporate the repair rp. This concludes the proof.
D Reparo in Ethereum
Formal description of the Reparo protocol in Ethereum with a PoS consensus is given in Fig-
ure 5.
D.1 Reparo in Ethereum with PoW
We present here how one would instantiate Reparo in Ethereum with PoW based consensus done
currently. We present here only the differences from the PoS instance we presented in Section 4.
Repair Policy.
A repair proposal is approved according to Γ′.chkApproval with policy P, if the following
conditions hold:
• The proposal does not propose to modify the address fields or the value field of a trans-
action.
• The proposal is unambiguously not a double spend attack attempt (needs information
from the real world for confirmation).
11Ethereum uses Greedy Heaviest Order Sub Tree (GHOST) protocol to rank chains and this is slightly different
from the longest chain rule used in Bitcoin.
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The Ethereum protocol PoS consists of a sequence of rounds (slots) r and an epoch e consists of ` rounds.
Initialization. We initialize new databases the repair layer Rdb0 ← genesis, and the approved repairs
Adb0 ← ∅, set round r ← 1 and an empty list of repair proposals propPool← ∅.
For a given epoch e and for each round r, first initialize Adbr ← ∅, Rdbr ← ∅ and we describe the
following sequence of execution.
Proposal. A node creates a repair proposal rp?j ← Γ′.proposeRepair(C, j,TX ?j ) (refer Algorithm 1) for
block Bj , j ∈ [r − 1] using transactions TX ?j . It then broadcasts it to the network.
Update Proposal pool. Collect all repair proposals rp?j from the network and add rp
?
j to propPool iff
rp?j is valid; otherwise discard rp
?
j . If r is the beginning of an epoch, then set
Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) := voting where vj is a vote for rp?j .
Repairing the chain. For all repair proposals rp?j := 〈TX ?j 〉 ∈ propPool, we denote a vote
vj ← Γ′.Vt(C, rp?j ) and do:
1. If Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = approve, then call algorithm (C′,Rdb′)← Γ′.repairChain(C,Rdb, rp?j )
(refer Algorithm 2). Here j-th block in C′ is 〈headerj , rp?j 〉 and subsequent blocks’ states are
updated accordingly. Then do the following,
(a) Add TX ?j to Adbr and remove rp
?
j from propPool
(b) set local chain C = C′ and update Rdb = Rdb′
2. If Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = reject, then remove rp?j from propPool
3. If Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = voting, then do nothing
Deliberation process. For all repair proposals rp?j ∈ propPool satisfying
Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = voting (where vj is vote for rp?j ), that the node is willing to endorse,
1. Parse the proposal rp?j := 〈TX ?j 〉
2. Generate vj ← Γ′.Vt(C, s?j ). Create a vote transaction voteTx with voteTx.data= vj
3. Broadcast voteTx.
Proposing a new block. Collect all transactions, denoted by TX from the network for the r-th
round and try to build a new block Br:
1. (Determine state transition from the head of the chain). Repair the chain by applying the repair
proposals that are approved: ∀rp?j = TX ?j such that Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = approve, where
vj ← Γ′.Vt(C, rp?j ), set ACC = δ(ACC r−1,TX ).
2. (Proof of Stake). Extend chain and Reparo data structures as follows,
(a) Let Acc∗ be the account of the stakeholder, generate
σ ← prf pos(C,Acc∗, (H(headerr−1), G(TX )))
(b) Set hd := (σ,Acc∗) and complete header by appropriately setting other values
(c) Set new block Br ← 〈header,TX 〉
(d) Extend local chain C ← C||Br, the repair layer Rdb← Rdb||Rdbr and the approved repairs
Adb← Adb||Adbr
(e) Then broadcast (C,Rdb,Adb) to the network
Updating the chain. When a node receives C,Rdb, and Adb, check if the chain is valid by calling
Γ′.validateChain(C,Rdb,Adb) = 1. Accept the new chain if the new chain is valid as per PoS’s fork
resolution rule.
Figure 5: Reparo protocol integration into Ethereum with Algorand or Ouroboros Praos as
the underlying consensus and parameterized by policy P. Meaning prf pos is instantiated with
Algorand or Praos.
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The Ethereum protocol consists of a sequence of rounds r.
Initialization. We initialize new databases the repair layer Rdb0 ← genesis, and the approved repairs
Adb0 ← ∅, set round r ← 1 and an empty list of repair proposals propPool← ∅.
For each round r, first initialize Adbr ← ∅, Rdbr ← ∅ and we describe the following sequence of execution.
Proposal. A node creates a repair proposal rp?j ← Γ′.proposeRepair(C, j,TX ?j ) (refer Algorithm 1) for
block Bj , j ∈ [r − 1] using transactions TX ?j . It then broadcasts it to the network.
Update Proposal pool. Collect all repair proposals rp?j from the network and add rp
?
j to propPool iff
rp?j is valid; otherwise discard rp
?
j .
Repairing the chain. For all repair proposals rp?j := 〈TX ?j 〉 ∈ propPool, we denote a vote
vj ← Γ′.Vt(C, rp?j ) and do:
1. If Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = approve, then call algorithm (C′,Rdb′)← Γ′.repairChain(C,Rdb, rp?j ).
Here j-th block in C′ is 〈headerj , rp?j 〉 and subsequent blocks’ states are updated accordingly.
Then do the following,
(a) Add TX ?j to Adbr and remove rp
?
j from propPool
(b) set local chain C = C′ and update Rdb = Rdb′
2. If Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = reject, then remove rp?j from propPool
3. If Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = voting, then do nothing
Mining a new block. Collect all transactions, denoted by TX from the network for the r-th round
and try to build a new block Br:
1. (Deliberation process). For all repair proposals rp?j ∈ propPool that the node is willing to endorse,
(a) Parse the proposal rp?j := 〈TX ?j 〉
(b) Generate vj ← Γ′.Vt(C, s?j ). If Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = voting then create a vote
transaction voteTx with voteTx.data= vj
(c) Update TX ← TX ||voteTx
2. (Determine state transition from the head of the chain). Repair the chain by applying the repair
proposals that are approved: ∀rp?j = TX ?j such that Γ′.chkApproval(P, vj) = approve, where
vj ← Γ′.Vt(C, rp?j ), set ACC = δ(ACC r−1,TX ).
3. (Mining). Extend chain and Reparo data structures as follows,
(a) Perform standard Ethereum mining and set new block Br ← 〈header,TX 〉
(b) Extend local chain C ← C||Br, the repair layer Rdb← Rdb||Rdbr and the approved repairs
Adb← Adb||Adbr
(c) Then broadcast (C,Rdb,Adb) to the network
Updating the chain. When a node receives C,Rdb, and Adb, check if the chain is valid by calling
Γ′.validateChain(C,Rdb,Adb) = 1. Accept the new chain if the new chain is valid as per Ethereum’s fork
resolution rule11.
Figure 6: Reparo protocol integration into Ethereum with PoW based consensus and parame-
terized by policy P
• The proposal does not redact or modify votes in the chain.
• The proposal has received more than ρ fraction of votes (50% of votes) in ` consecutive
blocks (voting period, that can decided by the system) after the corresponding repairTx is
included in the chain.
Performing Repair Operations. Upon approval with respect to the policy P repair op-
erations are performed as they were performed in the PoS variant. Additionally, in the PoW
29
system, there are no restrictions on the redaction policy except for the ones discussed above.
Unlike the PoS variant, we can redact transactions as a whole since the consensus is independent
of the state of accounts.
Block Validation. Block validation is the same as in the PoS variant, except that now instead
of checking for PoS consensus we check if the block has the correct nonce for PoW. A formal
description of the procedure can be found in Algorithm 5.
Security and public verifiability properties are the same way as in the PoS variant. We
describe the security argument here for completeness.
Security. Since the hash function H is modeled as a random oracle (RO), finding a collision
on a vote (which is the hash of the ID of the old transaction and the ID of the candidate
transaction) is highly improbable. Therefore, when a miner votes for a repair proposal in his
newly mined block, no adversary can claim a different repair proposal for the same vote value.
Same property of the hash function H also ensures that no adversary can find a different block
that hashes to the same hash of an honestly mined block. Therefore an adversary cannot break
the integrity of the chain. Together, they imply the unforgeability of votes, as if an adversary
wishes to vote, he has to mine a block with his vote himself. Assuming majority of the miners
are honest in Ethereum, Reparo integration with Ethereum satisfies editable common prefix and
preserves chain quality and chain growth with respect to repair policy P.
Optimizations. State Assertion: Instead of recomputing the state, a repairTx can propose
a state for the affected contract and accounts. The protocol can then inject this state if allowed
by the policy. This method is inexpensive as it is without any cascading computation and is
useful for users who accidentally locked their funds [9].
D.2 Repairs in Ethereum
6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.25 7.50 7.75 8.00
Block Number (in Million)
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
Ti
m
e 
(in
 se
co
nd
s)
Client Import Time Comparison
Modified Client
Unmodified Client
Figure 7: Client Comparison: The cumulative time taken to import 2, 038, 219 blocks.
Estimating Repair Time. Figure 7 plots the cumulative time taken to process the blocks
plotted against the block number. For example, taking a point at block number 6, 500, 753, the
point on the orange line reports the time 75, 548.49s. It would take 75, 548.49s to recompute
the state after changing a transaction at a block 500, 753 deep and rebuilding the states. This
can be used in conjunction with the data in Figure 4 to determine the time it would take the
network to build new states and also measure the impact of a repair on the import for archive
or full sync nodes.
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D.3 Prominent Bugs
In Table 7 we provide the information of some of the popular bugs.
DAO. This is a re-entrancy bug in the contract that allowed a maliciously crafted call to drain
the balance of the contract before it subtracted the balance from the user. We propose to fix
this contract by updating all DAO contract creation contracts with the bug fixed code. This
is different from the ad-hoc solution employed by Ethereum today. Ethereum hard-coded the
address for DAO and executes the contract differently. This ensured that the blockchain should
have no transaction dependency because the blockchain already has the state with the contract
fixed. This in conjunction with the repair proposal allows an inexpensive repair for DAO even
though it has a lot of dependent transactions.
Parity Multisig Wallet Bug. The Parity Mutli Sig Wallet is a library contract that had a
bug which had a public constructor that allowed any user to take control of the contract. A user
took ownership of the contract and accidentally killed it. We propose to repair this contract
by undoing the transaction that killed the contract. The transaction dependency is unaffected
as it just resurrects a dead contract. This enables all Parity Multisig Wallet holders to safely
recover their funds.
QuadrigaCX (QCX) and REXmls. These contracts have hardcoded wrong addresses in
the contract which sent the ICO ETH to an incorrect address (an account that does not exist)
thereby permanently locking the coins in those contracts. We propose to repair this bug by
proposing a repair transaction with the same code but with the correct address, which can be
used to recover and return the lost funds.
No code contract. There are 2, 986 such contract creation transactions which have money
but no code in the creation call. The idea to solve the no code contract problem, is to allow
the user to add code to the contract. We give a template of the code in Figure 8. The contract
allows the user who locked the money in a contract to retrieve the money.
E Other Instantiations
In this section we discuss how our protocol can be instantiated into other systems like Bitcoin
and Cardano. Note that Cardano is a Proof of Stake [31, 16] based system. Even though Bitcoin
and Ethereum are PoW based systems, we discuss Bitcoin instantiation because redaction of
illicit data entries is a major problem in Bitcoin and we want to highlight our improvements
compared to the work of Deuber et al. [25].
E.1 Integrating into Bitcoin
Deuber et al. [25] instantiated their redactable blockchain protocol with Bitcoin and showed
how to redact harmful illicit content from data pockets in transactions. We now describe how
to instantiate our Reparo protocol from Figure 2 on top of Bitcoin for removal of arbitrary non-
payment data bytes (stateless repairs) and any other repair operations if such a need arises. We
primarily focus on the former repair operations in case Bitcoin as removal of illicit data entries
is immediate critical problem to solve.
The main differences between [25] and ours when Reparo is integrated into Bitcoin are:
12DAO with transaction hash: 0xe9ebfecc2fa10100db51a - 4408d18193b3ac504584b51a4e55bdef1318f0a30f9
13Quadriga CX with transaction hash: 0xf4c8423215e8abb2810ff - 0b2eb82a93ce660a0ce651df5f14005e08f6e25318e
14Parity with transaction hash: 0x348ec4b5a396c95b4a5524ab0 - ff61b5f6e434098cf6e5c1a6887bed2bc35625d
15REXmls (imbrex) token with transaction hash: 0xcb6b1e83452608 -
65b5e164e09584634960ec1d02d80d3bbb4e1533c77393d216
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pragma solidity ^0.5.0;
contract simpleWithdraw {
address private owner;
uint256 money;
constructor() public payable {
owner = msg.sender;
money = msg.value;
}
function withDraw() public {
if (msg.sender == owner) {
selfdestruct(msg.sender);
}
}
}
Figure 8: Contract to retrieve lost money
1. Our protocol does not require the modification of the Bitcoin block header.
2. As a consequence of the above point, we do not require an additional hash value to be
stored in every Bitcoin block header like their protocol. This makes our protocol much
more space efficient than theirs.
3. Our protocol is immediately integrable into Bitcoin in a backward compatible fashion.
This means that already existing illicit data entries in Bitcoin can be redacted once Reparo
is fit on top of Bitcoin today.
4. Unlike [25], we handle both stateless redactions and stateful repair operations.
We refer to [25] for basic understanding of how Bitcoin transactions work and how arbitrary
data can be inserted into transactions.
Regarding user roles, as described in Section 4, miners also happen to be deciders in the
instance of Bitcoin. Miners vote for proposal s as they happen to mine blocks similar to the
protocol in [25].
Data Structures. Note that unlike [25] we do not require any modification of the Bitcoin
block structure. Instead we have a repair layer Rdb for each block that is empty when the block
is mined.
Proposing Repairs. Similar to [25] we have a special transaction repairTx that contains
the hash of the old and new version of the transaction in its output script. In other words
the transaction id’s TxID and Tx
?
ID are stored. In this case Tx
? is the candidate transaction.
The user then broadcasts repairTx and Tx? to the network; repairTx requires a transaction
fee to be included in the blockchain, while Tx? is added to a pool of candidate transactions.
The candidate transaction Tx? is validated by checking its contents with respect to Tx, and if
it is valid, then it can be considered for voting. For stateless repairs like redacting arbitrary
non-payment data entries only, it is checked if the only difference between Tx and Tx? is that
of the missing data entry in Tx?.
Repair Policy. Our protocol is parameterized by a repair policy parameter P similar to [25].
For the case of redacting non-payment data entries we follow the same basic policy recom-
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mendations as theirs. For completeness, we detail the policy requirements here. A proposed
redaction is approved valid if the following conditions hold:
• It is identical to the transaction being replaced, except that it can remove data.
• It can only remove data that can never be spent, e.g., OP RETURN output scripts.
• It does not redact votes for other redactions in the chain.
• It received more than 50% of votes in the 1024 consecutive blocks (voting period) after
the corresponding repairTx is stable in the chain.
Similar to the discussion on repair policy for Ethereum Section 4, we argue that the policy
for handling such stateful repair proposal s can be quite event specific and strongly dependent
on auxiliary information from the real world. The auxiliary information from the real world
helps to see if a particular stateful repair proposal is good for the chain or not. As a minimum
requirement from the policy (to help miners detect malicious proposals), a proposed stateful
repair operation is approved valid if the following conditions hold:
• It is unambiguosly not a double spend attack attempt (needs auxiliary information from
the real world for confirmation).
• It cannot propose to repair a transaction thereby making it an invalid spend.
• It does not change the amounts being transacted.
• It does not redact or modify votes in the chain.
• It received more than 50% of votes in the 1024 consecutive blocks (voting period) after
the corresponding repairTx is stable in the chain.
Deliberation for a proposal is done via voting by miners. Voting for a candidate transaction
Tx? simply means that the miner includes repairTxID = H(TxID||Tx?ID) in the coinbase (trans-
action) of the new block he produces. After the voting phase is over as determined by the policy
P, the candidate transaction is removed from the candidate pool.
Performing Repair Operations. Our protocol slightly varies from [25] in this regard. In case
of stateless repair operations like redactions, once a candidate transaction has been approved
by the redaction policy, the miners in the network replace the old version of the transaction
(being repaired) and replaces it with the candidate transaction, while storing the hash of the old
version in the corresponding repair layer Rdb of the block. In case of stateful repair operations,
the entire old version of the transaction is stored in the corresponding repair layer of the block.
Updating UTXO with Stateful Repair Operations. Since stateful repair operations could
involve changing payment information which could affect the UTXO database after the mining
of a block, special care needs to be taken in updating the UTXO. When a repair operation
proposal is approved, the miners perform the repair operation as discussed above. The UTXOs
after each of the following blocks upto the most recent block is accordingly updated. This
could mean that some transactions in these blocks become invalid spends as their input is no
longer in the UTXO database at the time that block was mined (after performing the repair
operation). This is the cascading state update that was discussed previously in the case of
Ethereum Appendix D.1. After performing the repair operation and reflecting it in the UTXO
database at each subsequent block, the miners try to mine a new block by including transactions
that are consistent with the updated UTXO database at that time.
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Chain Validation. To validate a full chain a miner needs to validate all the blocks within
the chain. We discuss the general case where both stateless (redactions) and stateful repair op-
erations could have been performed on the chain. Consequently our chain validation procedure
is different from [25] as ours is more generic. For validation, the miner uses the repair layer
of the blocks in the chain to go back in time to the mined version of the blocks. This ensures
that the miner is now having the the original state of the chain. Note that this holds true even
in case of stateless redactions as the repair layer Rdb would contain the hash of old version of
the transaction. The miner now validates the chain from the genesis by “re-mining” the chain,
with the catch that instead of solving for PoW, he verifies the existing PoW. Since the miner is
validating the blocks as if when they were freshly mined, a valid PoW (in the past) remains a
valid PoW now for the miner. If ever some stateful or stateless repair proposal was approved,
the miner performs the repair operation that is required to be performed (as it would have been
performed). This way the miner validates and re-constructs the chain. The miner rejects a
chain as invalid if any of the following holds: (1) a block’s repair operation was not approved
according to the policy, or (2) a previously approved repair was not performed on the chain.
Validating Transactions. Validating a chain involves validating a block and its contents as
a subroutine. The miner validates all the transactions contained in its transactions list against
the current database of UTXOs; the validation of unedited transactions is performed in the
same way as in the immutable version of the Bitcoin protocol. The miner simply validates
transactions in the block against their witnesses. In case of having only the hash old version of
the transaction and the old witness (this is the case of removal of non-payment data entries -
stateless redactions), the miner can validate the witness with respect to the new version of the
transaction as the payment scripts are unchanged in a stateless redaction. This is similar to
the validation in [25]. Therefore, we can ensure that all the transactions included in the block
have a valid witness, or in case of redacted transactions, the old version of the transaction had
a valid witness.
E.2 Integrating into Cardano (PoS)
Cardano is a cryptocurrency that runs the Ouroboros PoS consensus mechanism. Our interest
in this system is to show how one can instantiate our Reparo protocol Figure 2 on top of a PoS
based blockchain.
Similarities between Bitcoin and Cardano. Transactions in Cardano work the same
way as in Bitcoin and Cardano is based on a UTXO model. The address field in Cardano has
additional semantics for the staking procedure of the PoS consensus process. Block headers in
Cardano are more or less the same as in Bitcoin except for consensus proof which is different
from the PoW value in Bitcoin.
Consensus. The time is divided into 120 second slots and each slot has a slot leader elected to
propose the new block. The slot leaders are elected with a winning probability proportional to
their stake in the system. In an epoch which lasts for 20 hours, the slot leaders for each slot of
the next epoch are determined but not revealed. As a proof of election, the elected slot leader
generates a signature proving his stake in the system, which can be verified by everyone else.
Policy for PoS. The repair policy requirements is more or less the same as discussed previously
for systems like Ethereum and Bitcoin. However, now we do not allow redactions that affect the
state of the system. In case of a stateful redaction, as the state of the chain has changed, the
data point that causes this state change is erased/redacted. In PoS based blockchain systems,
such a stateful redaction causes failure in chain validation as an honest new user can no longer
verify the stakeholder consensus proof. This is because the stake distribution has changed,
but the transaction resulting in the older stake distribution is no longer stored and therefore
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consensus proofs based on the older stake distribution can no longer be verified.
Repairing and Chain Validation. The only difference in terms of proposing and finally
performing a repair operation is that the voting period for a repair proposal begins from start
of the immediately next epoch and spans throughout that epoch. This is to ensure that chain
validation procedure is able to validate consensus after repair operations have been performed.
In more detail, recall that the chain validation as described for Bitcoin, we go back in time and
validate the blocks in the state in which they were mined and perform repair operations just
the way they were performed. When following this procedure, one must be able to validate the
consensus proof, PoW in Bitcoin and PoS in Cardano. As mentioned earlier, the slot leaders
for the current epoch are determined by the end of the previous epoch. Consider a case where
there is a repair proposal whose voting period starts in the middle of an epoch and ends in the
middle of the next epoch and gets approved. The miner performs the repair operation that
could potentially change the state and thereby the stakes. This makes the verification of the
elected slot leaders for the rest half of the slots in the epoch inefficient and time consuming,
as these slot leaders were determined by the state before the repair operation was performed.
In order to avoid this inefficiency, we let the voting period to be synchronized with the epoch
period of Cardano. Chain validation can now proceed as in Bitcoin, except that the consensus
is PoS [31].
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Algorithm 5: validateBlock
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn), repair layer Rdb = (Rdb1, · · · ,Rdbn), block Bn+1, repair
approved Adbn+1.
output: {⊥, (C′,Rdb′)}
1: Parse Bn+1 := 〈headern+1,TX n+1〉(ACCn+1), where headern+1 = (ptn+1, G(TX n+1), hdn+1);
2: Parse Bn := 〈headern,TX n〉(ACCn), where headern = (ptn, G(TX n), hdn);
3: Validate transactions xn+1, if invalid return ⊥;
4: if ptn+1 6= H(headern) then return ⊥;
5: if Adbn+1 = ∅ ∧ACCn+1 = δ(yn, xn+1) ∧ chk pow(headern+1) then Set C′ ← C||Bn+1, and
Rdb′ ← Rdb||∅, and return (C′,Rdb′);
. Validate Blocks where repairs were approved
6: Initialize C′ ← C,Rdb′ ← Rdb;
7: for all TX ?j ∈ Adbn+1 do
. Perform all the repair operations
8: Parse Bj := 〈headerj ,TX j〉(ACC j), where headerj = (ptj , G(TX
′
j), hd j);
9: if chkApproval
(
P, H
(
Gtx (TX j),Gtx (TX
?
j )
)) 6= approve then return ⊥;
10: Set ACC ?j := δ(ACC j−1,TX
?
j );
. Perform the repairs as originally performed
11: C′,Rdb′ ← repairChain(C′,Rdb′, rp?j );
12: Parse C′ := (B′1, · · · , B′n) and B′n := 〈header′n,TX
′
n〉;
. Check the state transition after repair
13: if ACCn+1 = δ(ACC
′
n,TX n+1) ∧ chk pow(headern+1) then Set C′ ← C||Bn+1, and
Rdb′ ← Rdb||∅ and return (C′,Rdb′);
14: return ⊥;
Table 7: Prominent Smart Contract Bugs
Bug Start Block ETH Affected
DAO12 1, 428, 757 3, 600, 000
QuadrigaCX13 1, 952, 428 67, 317
Parity Multisig14 4, 049, 249 513, 736
REXmls15 4, 066, 859 6, 687
No Code Contracts − 6533.17
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